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I. INTRODUCTION
"Everybody drank the Kool-Aid," said David Zugheri, co-founder of
Texas-based lender First Houston Mortgage. They knew if they
didn't give the borrower the loan they wanted, the borrower "could
go down the street and get that loan somewhere else."'
Between 2003-2007, 588 mortgage brokers licensed in Florida had
criminal records that should have been an obstacle to obtaining a mort-
gage broker license.2 While such numbers could be brushed aside as just
a glitch in conducting background checks, the problem goes deeper. Par-
ticularly since Florida law at the time prohibited felons from becoming
licensed mortgage brokers; revealing that these brokers should have
never been able to obtain licenses in the first place.
Given such, the argument for more regulation in response to the
* Writing & Research Editor of the University of Miami Law Review. This note is dedicated
to my family, especially my husband. I thank Professor Manning for his guidance and Jarred
Leibner for editing.
1. Liar Loans to Prolong Mortgage Crisis, ARIZ. CENT., Aug. 18, 2008.
2. See Rob Barry, Matthew Haggman & Jack Dolan, Borrowers Betrayed: State Let
Crooked Brokers Keep Stealing, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 10, 2008, at Al.
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subprime crisis is dubious. Instead, the failure to enforce existing laws is
the more likely culprit. The Florida laws should have prevented such
criminals from obtaining broker licenses in the first place. More impor-
tantly, the laws should have established functional enforcement mecha-
nisms to resolve discrepancies between who can hold a license and who
actually did. Instead, these and many other weaknesses of the mortgage
broker industry went unchecked until the current panic hit.
While many forces and players contributed to the economic crisis,
this article focuses exclusively on the regulation of mortgage brokers
and the failure to enforce state regulations. The issue is what would be
the best legislative response to the mortgage broker's role in the modem
market. This article argues for enforcing existing regulations instead of
wasting time and resources by enacting more legislation. Mortgage bro-
kers are a recent yet substantial segment of the mortgage market that are
best managed by enforcing existing regulations. It first is necessary to
define what exactly a mortgage broker is in order to best approach mort-
gage broker regulation.
The mortgage brokerage industry began in the late 1970s and has
since boomed in the past three decades.3 As expanded upon in detail
below, a mortgage broker is essentially a conduit between a potential
borrower and a lender.4 The broker first compiles a borrower's profile
by gathering information from the borrower.5 Ideally, the broker then
performs the legwork for the borrower in gathering and screening poten-
tial loans.6 A mortgage broker faces two possible levels of regulation.
First, a broker's actions may be governed by federal law under certain
limited circumstances. 7 Alternatively and more commonly, state law
applies to mortgage brokering.' Before the crisis struck most states
3. See Morris M. Kleiner & Richard M. Todd, Mortgage Broker Regulations that Matter:
Analyzing Earnings, Employment, and Outcomes for Consumers 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 13684, Dec. 2007) ("[Mortgage brokers'] role in the U.S. mortgage
market has mushroomed from insignificant in 1980 to predominant in recent years.").
4. See id. at 2.
5. See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the
Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 271, 290 (2008).
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia, 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (explaining preemption analysis in this
context); see also Florida Financial Services Commission, Emergency Rules 69VER08-1,
69VER08-2, and 69VER08-3 (Aug. 12, 2008) (enacted in response to "The Secure and Fair
Enforcement in Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008"). Additionally, federal legislation which could
possibly eliminate "yield spread premiums" is currently making its way through Congress. See
H.R. 1728. The bill is called the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, an
amendment to the Truth in Lending Act, which the House of Representatives has passed but the
Senate has not.
8. See, e.g., Michelle Singletary, Color of Money: 1977 Lending Measure Not to Blame for
Crisis, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 12, 2008 at E5 ("More than half of subprime loans were made by
[Vol. 64:11451146
REINING IN ON MORTGAGE BROKERS
already had comprehensive mortgage broker regulations on the books.9
Mortgage brokers still exploited the mortgage structure and contrib-
uted to the crisis despite such state regulations. Numerous factors con-
tributed to the mortgage crisis making it a "perfect storm."'" These
factors include brokers facilitating access to mortgage products by previ-
ously untapped borrowers, mortgage products innovations that allowed
brokers to pass along risk, a broader market of mortgage lenders whose
loans brokers could shop, and a sky-rocketing housing market making
brokers' promises of refinancing feasible as long as prices continued
ballooning. "
Many players were instrumental in creating the current economic
mess. Yet this article focuses exclusively on mortgage brokers' contribu-
tion to the crisis. Part II first examines how the mortgage broker market
reached its current dismal state. This is done in the context of defining a
mortgage broker, tracking their growth to a position of importance in the
market, and exploring the dynamics of how and why their role was
solidified. Next, Part III evaluates the pre-crisis legislative responses to
the mortgage broker in Arizona, California and Florida-three states
notoriously hard-hit by the housing crisis. Part IV of this article finally
urges states to enforce existing laws that are adequate in substance
instead of imposing new duplicative regulations. Weighing potential
criticisms, Part V argues that effective enforcement of existing regula-
tions strikes the necessary balance between the need for immediate
action and the long-term management of a significant component of the
modern mortgage market.
II. How WE GOT HERE
A. Defining a "Mortgage Broker"
Defining a mortgage broker is the critical first step in evaluating the
proper regulatory response. The American Bar Association defines a
mortgage broker as "[a]n individual or company who brings borrowers
and lenders together for the purpose of loaning money. The mortgage
broker might also negotiate with the lender to help the borrower get a
better deal on the mortgage loan."' 2 While there are both commercial
independent mortgage companies not subject to comprehensive federal supervision.
(citation omitted).
9. See Chris Casacchia, New Arizona Law Imposes Regulations on Loan Officers, PHOENIX
Bus. J., July 14, 2008, at 1 ("At least 30 other states have loan officer licensing requirements.").
10. See Brescia, supra note 5, at 311.
11. See id.
12. ABA Section of Real Property, Trust and Estate Law, Real Estate FAQs, (VI) Glossary of
Commonly Used Terms, http://www.abanet.org/rppt/public/realestate/glossary.html.
11472010]
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and residential mortgage brokers, 3 this article focuses on the latter.
The concept of a mortgage broker is a recent innovation. In the
mid-1970's, savings and loans, commercial banks and mortgage bankers
were the predominant originators and holders of single-family mort-
gages. 4 "In the past, applying for a loan and the pricing of a loan were
done primarily at a local bank, often selling only its own products."' 5
The shift away from savings and loans to mortgage brokers began in the
1980's.16 "Interest rate volatility, widespread bank failures and capital
market and information technology innovations in the 1980s moved the
mortgage industry away from federally regulated banks and savings and
loans to more specialized arenas."' 7 As a result, mortgage brokers have
now come to dominate the loan origination market. The Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis estimates two-thirds of mortgage loan transactions
in 2006 occurred through third-party mortgage brokers. 8 The origina-
tions are also concentrated in a few thousand firms. 9
Additionally, technological advances made it possible for much of
the mortgage lending process to be "outsourced" to mortgage brokers.2 °
Internet sites requiring only borrowers' basic information quickly
matched borrowers with brokers,21 thus triggering the brokers' roles in
the transaction. The sales and underwriting functions of mortgages were
therefore bifurcated, thus enabling mortgage brokers to act as indepen-
dent contractors with respect to multiple lenders.22
Simply put, "mortgage brokers are intermediaries matching poten-
tial mortgage borrowers and lenders and assist them in completing the
13. See Fact Sheet About NAMB and the Mortgage Broker Industry, NAMB, http://www.
namb.org/namb/FactSheet.asp?SnID= 1247328637.
14. See generally U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, Regarding Lender
Payments to Mortgage Brokers, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/res/respO222.cfm
(last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
15. J. Alex Heroy, Other People's Money: How a Time-Gap in Credit Reporting May Lead to
Fraud, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 321, 325 (March 2008) (citation omitted).
16. See generally U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, Regarding Lender
Payments to Mortgage Brokers, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/res/respO222.cfm
(last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
17. Christopher W. Backley et al., License to Deal: Regulation in the Mortgage Broker
Industry, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, July 2006, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/
publicationspapers/pub display.cfm?id=2257.
18. Id.
19. Amany El Anshasy et al., Mortgage Brokers and the Subprime Mortgage Market 1 (May
2004) (unpublished discussion draft, on file with CiteSeer) (citation omitted).
20. Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 6.
21. See Alex Veiga, Sites Conjure Up Mortgage Quotes, Play Up Privacy, ARIz. CENT., Aug.
27, 2008 (discussing several web sites that allow potential borrowers to compare various lenders'
loans by merely entering basic personal information such as the loan amount, the property value,
and the locality in which the property is located).
22. See Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 6.
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REINING IN ON MORTGAGE BROKERS
loan origination process. '"23
A detailed application process, financial and credit worthiness inves-
tigation, and extensive disclosure requirements must be completed in
order for a wholesale lender to evaluate a consumer's home loan
request. The broker simplifies this process for the borrower and the
wholesale lender, by conducting this research, counseling consumers
on their loan package choices, and enabling them to select the right
loan for their home buying needs. The mortgage loan process can be
arduous, costly, and seemingly impossible to the consumer. The bro-
ker works as the liaison between the borrower and the lender to create
a cost effective and efficient loan process.
As an independent contractor, the broker allows wholesaler lenders to
cut origination costs by providing such services as preparing the bor-
rower's loan package, loan application, funding process, andcounsel-
ing the borrower.24
Mortgage brokers thus should play a pivotal informational role
between lenders and borrowers .2  A mortgage broker plays the impor-
tant role of ultimately identifying mortgage products appropriate for the
borrower and counsels them accordingly. 26 Assuming mortgage brokers
actually do their job in properly gathering and verifying borrower infor-
mation-a lofty assumption, their role is beneficial to consumers and
lenders alike. "By reducing the information asymmetry and confirming
that a borrower has the economic resources to repay a credit obligation,
mortgage brokers have helped to expand an emerging market that was
initially difficult for banks to access."27 Mortgage brokers thus expand
the market of potential loans, aspiring borrowers, and prospective lend-
ers by streamlining an otherwise muddled system.
In this respect, mortgage brokers should make the process more
efficient for both borrowers and lenders. They consolidate information
for borrowers and provide a convenient way to evaluate available home
loans.28 As opposed to traditional one-stop lenders, mortgage brokers are
more likely to match borrowers with loans that are specifically tailored
23. Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 3.
24. Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 5 (citation omitted).
25. See Brescia, supra note 5, at 302 ("The mortgage broker therefore sits at a critical
juncture in the process and becomes not only a source of information about the process for the
prospective borrower, but also ultimately counsels the borrower on what he or she can afford and
identifies the mortgage product that, in the broker's and lender's opinion, is appropriate for the
borrower.").
26. See id.
27. Cassandra Jones Havard, "Goin' Round in Circles" ... and Letting the Bad Loans Win:
When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L.
REv. 737, 746-47 (2008).
28. See Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 7.
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to their requirements due to their access to more types of loans.29 Mort-
gage broker specialization and economies of scale also can reduce credi-
tors' origination CoStS. 30 "Use of brokers may also enable a creditor to
expand or contract mortgage lending more quickly and at a lower cost
than would be possible using its own employees and offices."'" Conse-
quently, the advent of mortgage brokers was at first welcomed given
their ability to make the mortgage market and entire process more
efficient.
Despite the potential benefits of mortgage brokers' role, there is
also the potential for exploitation. The one-time nature of the transaction
itself incentivizes quantity over quality.32 Brokers' mode of compensa-
tion reinforces this incentive structure. 3 3 Typically brokers are compen-
sated each time a mortgage is consummated, regardless of the long-term
viability of the underlying mortgage. 34 Generally, "[b]rokers earn money
through up-front fees, not ongoing loan payments. To make matters
worse for homeowners, brokers typically have a direct incentive to hike
interest rates higher than warranted by the risk of loans." 35 Brokers'
compensation structure is discussed in detail below as it directly relates
to brokers' rise in the mortgage market. Yet holding all other factors
equal, brokers have every incentive to gain lender approval of as many
excessively expensive mortgages as possible.36
B. Three Vehicles Enabling the Rise of the Mortgage Broker
Just twenty years ago, the mortgage broker market was by and large
"insignificant. ' 37 This is no longer the case. The Federal Reserve esti-
mates that mortgage brokers originated 60% of loans in the last several
years.38 In 2004, there were approximately fifty-three thousand mort-
29. See Jack Guttentag, Letter to the Editor, The Choice: Broker or Lender, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
2, 2005 ("The key difference between brokers and lenders is that brokers offer loan programs
from many different lenders. This means that brokers are more likely than a single lender to find a
loan that will meet the specialized needs of borrowers.").
30. Amany El Anshasy et al., supra note 19, at 1.
31. Id. at 3.
32. See Brescia, supra note 5, at 303.
33. See id. ("A mortgage broker who is compensated each time a mortgage is consummated,
and is rarely held accountable-short of being held responsible for outright acts of fraud,
particularly for failing to follow disclosure requirements imposed upon brokers-when those
borrowers are delinquent, will obviously pursue quantity over quality.").
34. See id.
35. Ending Mortgage Abuse: Safeguarding Homebuyers, Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on Housing, Transportation and Community
Development, 112th Cong. note 16 (June 26, 2007) (statement of Michael D. Calhoun, Center for
Responsible Lending) (citation omitted).
36. See id.
37. Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 2.
38. See Ted W. Lieu, What the Fed Isn't Fixing, L.A. TtMEs, July 16, 2008.
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gage broker firms in the United States. 39 That same year, such firms
originated as much as 68% of all mortgages.4" With originations totaling
$1.4 trillion dollars in 2004, the mortgage brokerage industry could no
longer be considered inconsequential.4 '
This article focuses on three driving forces in the rise of the mort-
gage broker. First, mortgage brokers answered the increased demand for
and availability of subprime mortgages. Second, the mortgage market's
structure of passing along risk allowed brokers to originate loans whose
long-term viability was questionable. Third, soaring housing prices
made brokers' refinancing promises feasible. Common to all three forces
is the synergism between it and the mortgage broker industry.
1. THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET
Subprime mortgages comprise of loans made to high-risk borrow-
ers.4" Between 1994-2003 subprime mortgages grew an average of 25%
per year.43 Adjustable rate mortgages, as opposed to traditional fixed-
rate, are characteristic of subprime markets. Non-traditional mortgages
were promoted at the federal level, most infamously by former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan." Also associated with the subprime
market are mortgages approved without verifying the borrower's infor-
mation.45 Such mortgages, dubbed "liar loans," are heavily concentrated
in Florida, California, Nevada and Arizona.4 6
There is a notable correlation between the number of mortgage bro-
kers and the number of subprime mortgages originated. 47 In 2006, mort-
gage brokers originated approximately two-thirds of all subprime
mortgages. 48 An estimated 70% of now delinquent subprime loans were
39. See Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 2 (citation omitted).
40. See id.
41. See Havard, supra note 27, at 744.
42. See Faten Sabry & Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A Primer, 1633
Practising Law Institute 89, 92 (Sept. 12, 2007) ("A subprime borrower is one who has a high
debt-to-income ratio, an impaired or minimal credit history, or other characteristics that are
correlated with a high probability of default relative to borrowers with good credit history.").
43. Sue Kirchoff & Sandra Block, Supbrime Loan Market Grows Despite Troubles, USA
TODAY, Dec. 7, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/housing/2004-12-07-subprime-day-
2-usat_x.htm.
44. See Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Board, Understanding Household
Debt Obiligations (Feb. 23, 2004) ("American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater
mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage.").
45. See Liar Loans to Prolong Mortgage Crisis, ARIZ. CENT., Aug. 18, 2008 ("[M]ortgages
approved without requiring proof of the borrower's income or assets. The worst of them earn the
nickname 'ninja loans,' short for 'no income, no job, and (no) assets.").
46. Id.
47. See Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 7.
48. See Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 42.
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made by mortgage brokers. 49 Subprime mortgages' share in total origi-
nations went from 8.6% in 2001 to a whopping 20.1% by 2006.50
Including all non-prime mortgage originations (both subprime and near-
prime) increases the latter number up to 40% of all originations.5 Thus,
it is evident why subprime mortgages have become somewhat of a niche
market for mortgage brokers, thus perpetuating one another.
52
2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONTEMPORARY MORTGAGE INDUSTRY
A second driving force in the growth of mortgage brokers is the
incentive structure of the modem mortgage market. While the origin and
growth of securitization broadly is beyond the scope of this article,53
suffice it to say securitization plays an important and numerically signif-
icant function in the mortgage industry.54 Broadly, securitization is the
process of bundling mortgages sold by lenders into bonds that are then
offered to individual and institutional investors.5 Securitization allowed
originators to pass off a risky loan since the loan would no longer be
kept on its own books. This tolerance at the originators' level affected
mortgage brokers as well, who sought out borrowers and loans that the
next party in the line would not have transacted with absent
securitization.
Simply put, modem mortgage financing involves numerous trans-
fers, each without scrutinizing the underlying mortgage.56
With the incentive of a quick payday once the mortgage is transferred
to another entity for sale as a security, the broker and originator, who
49. See Havard, supra note 27, at 742 (citing Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated Rolling
Equity: Analyzing Real Estate Loan Default in the Era of Securitization, 50 EMORY L.J. 519, 525
(2001)).
50. Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic 6, table 4 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No.
08-25, Sept. 30, 2008) (citation omitted).
51. DANIELLE DIMARTNO & JOHN V. DUCA, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Letter-Insights from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, Vol. 2, No. II (November 2007), available at http:/lwww.dallasfed.org/researchleclettl
2007/el0l L.html.
52. See Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 7; see also Susan Block-Lieb & Edward Janger,
Demand-Side Gatekeepers in the Market for Home Loans (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies
Research Papers, Paper No. 182, 2010) available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1548523 (discussing
how innovative securities, including subprime mortgages, were issued in part due to the market's
demand and the standards for such securities were relaxed on the supply side due to the passing
off of risk).
53. See generally Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 42, at 94 (explaining the process of how
a mortgage is securitized); Roger Lowenstein, Long-Term Capital: It's a Short-Term Memory,
N.Y. TiMES, N.Y. Ed., Sept. 7, 2008, at BUI (discussing risk and derivatives markets).
54. See Gorton, supra note 50, at 6 ("[tln 2005 and 2006 [subprime mortgage] originations
were about $1.2 trillion of which 80 percent was securitized.").
55. Kirchoff & Block, supra note 43.
56. See Havard, supra note 27, at 746.
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are both now interested in generating the fees associated with the
mortgage closing, are driven by a desire to package as many loans as
possible... The lender no longer has an incentive that is tied to the
borrower's interest in long-term sustainability of the mortgage, and
the broker is no longer interested in his or her reputation of bringing
viable borrowers to the lenders. The subprime market thus created a
classic "moral hazard" similar to that created during the Savings &
Loan crisis where banks could lend regardless of the risk; with an
advantage in information, no accountability and little risk, brokers
and originators in the subprime market were able to engage in aggres-
sive rent seeking, leaving borrowers and the holders of securities with
no recourse and devalued assets.
57
The lack of scrutiny of the borrower's information allowed for the
growth of the mortgage broker industry by leaving unchecked the role of
brokers as conduits of information between lenders and borrowers. This
lack of scrutiny was especially troubling because accurately pricing
securities and derivatives requires accurate information regarding the
underlying asset's "real" value.58
Yet brokers no longer had a reason to incur the extra cost of verify-
ing borrower information and accurately ascertaining value since any
credit risk was passed on in the series of transfers. While some of the
risk is inherent in the mortgage market structure, its risk transfers ena-
bled brokers to exploit its deficiencies and solidify their role in the mort-
gage industry. Yet this is only one of many factors attributable to
mortgage brokers' ascendancy.
3. HOUSING PRICE BUBBLE
If market price can be determined by past performance, all indica-
tions were that housing prices should continue their upward trend.9
Home value increased over 54% between 2001-2005.60
Brokers undoubtedly took into account expected home value appre-
ciation when matching borrowers with potential mortgages, expecting
borrowers would be able to refinance after a few years.6 ' "The ability of
subprime and [other high-risk] borrowers to sustain their mortgage pay-
57. Brescia, supra note 5, at 297
58. Dorit Samuel, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Will New Regulations Help Avoid Future
Financial Debacles?, 2 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 217, 249 (2009) ("Given the fact that all derivatives
are ultimately dependent upon the "real" value of their underlying assets and are directly subject
to the vicissitudes of the market for those real assets, the need for readily available and widespread
dissemination of clear information concerning those assets is imperative.").
59. See, e.g., Jim Clayton, Rational Expectations, Market Fundamentals and Housing Price
Volatility, 24 Real Estate Economics 441 (Winter 1996).
60. See Gorton, supra note 50, at 20 (citation omitted).
61. See Gorton, supra note 50.
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Source: Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007, Yale Sch. of Mgmt. and
Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, p.51 (Aug. 25, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1255362 (citation omitted).
ments depends heavily on housing price appreciation because of the
need for refinancing. 62 During the periods of rapid home price appreci-
ation, mortgagors could also borrow against their equity to make house
payments or sell their homes to settle their debts.63
As home prices continued to rise and even after initial "teaser" rates
expired and adjustable rate mortgage terms kicked in, existing bor-
rowers were able to refinance mortgages with unfavorable terms due
to the increased equity they enjoyed with rising home prices ...
These refinances made more money available to borrowers, and bor-
rowers dipped into their growing equity to pay their mortgage brokers
and originators for the ability to refinance, even when these actors
may have been the same individuals and companies the borrowers
had paid when they assumed the initial underlying mortgage. In this
way, the strong market delayed any questions about affordability of
the underlying mortgage, or the inequitable nature of its terms, to a
day when rising home values could no longer make up for the bor-
rower's inability to meet the terms of his or her mortgage.6 4
In addition to the housing price boom, the impetus for refinancing also
stemmed from deregulation at the federal level. "Congress in 1986
ended the deductibility of consumer debt, such as credit card payments,
though still letting filers deduct mortgage interest. The change provided
incentives for refinancing."65 Further federal legislation in the 1980s laid
the groundwork for the current market. This legislation included the
62. Id.
63. DiMartino & Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas Economic Letter-Insights form the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Vol. 2, No. 11 (Nov.
2007), http://www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2007/el0l1 .html.
64. Brescia, supra note 5, at 295.
65. Kirchoff & Block, supra note 43.
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Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act66 and
the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act,6 7 both of which
broadened the types of investments that banks and institutions, respec-
tively, could make.68 Loosening the standards created a larger demand
for securitized mortgages and trickled-down to mortgage brokers who in
turn reached into new markets of borrowers to satisfy this demand.
Deregulation certainly played a role in getting the mortgage market
to this point. While deregulation is a popular culprit in the wake of the
crisis, it was certainly not the only force. Instead, other factors such as
the assumed stability of the housing market as a whole also played a
significant role.
When housing prices took a severe downturn refinancing was no
longer an option. 69 "In 2006, when home prices flattened, interest rates
rose, and more onerous loan terms started to kick in for many subprime
mortgagors, the subprime crisis began to take its toll . . ."" The first
and major domino fell in the housing market and thus triggered a down-
ward spiral. Mortgage brokers and housing prices enjoyed a symbiotic
relationship from mutual gains, and when housing took a downturn it
was only a matter of time until it reached the mortgage brokers.
C. Self-Perpetuating Adverse Incentives
Generally, mortgage brokers are driven primarily by the fees
received from consummated mortgages. Brokers are compensated either
directly or indirectly. 7' Direct compensation represents a percentage of
the loan and is received from the borrower at or before closing.72 Indi-
rect compensation, referred to as "back funded payments" or "yield
spread premiums," is received from lenders or wholesalers.73 Indirect
compensation is typically either based on the interest rate of each loan
entered into or "volume-based. ' 74 "The higher the fees and interest rates
a mortgage broker packs into a loan, the greater their compensation."75
66. See 12 U.S.C. § 248(a) (2006).
67. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (2006).
68. Samuel, supra note 58, at 226.
69. See Gorton, supra note 50.
70. Brescia, supra note 5, at 296.
71. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, Regarding Lender Payments to





75. Jeanette Bradley & Peter Skillem, Predatory Lending: Subprime Lenders Trick
Homeowners Into Expensive Loans, Ntn'l Hous. Inst., Issue 109, Jan./Feb. 2000, http://www.nhi.
org/online/issues/109/bradley.html.
20101 1155
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Given the transaction-based nature of brokers' fees, their incentive is to
create and refinance as many loans as possible.
Brokers' compensation structure therefore emphasizes quantity
over quality of mortgages. "[Tihe cycles of finance and re-finance...
meant even more income for the brokers ...they would collect their
fees with each consummated mortgage or refinance agreement. In this
way, the interest of the mortgage brokers and originators is to enter into
as many mortgages as possible ....76 Yet entering into as many loans
as possible conflicts with the broker's role as the information gate-
keeper, and failing to fulfill that role the market was flooded with mort-
gage loans of dubious quality.
More specifically, brokers had an incentive to originate the most
high-interest loans possible. On a typical five-hundred thousand dollar
loan, a broker could make between twenty- to forty-thousand dollars in
fees.77 Brokers had a particular motive to place consumers in high-inter-
est riskier loans.7 8 "The higher the price the broker can induce the bor-
rower to pay, the larger the markup."79 A three-hundred thousand dollar
"liar loan" could mean as much as fifteen-thousand dollars in fees to the
broker.80 A comparable traditional loan would yield much less, between
two- to four-thousand dollars.81
It is thus evident how their compensation structure incentivized
steering borrowers "to mortgages that provide higher compensation to
the broker but are not necessarily the lowest cost or most advantageous
to the consumer."82 Further, brokers began to actively market mortgage
products to maximize fees realized from unrealistic mortgages and fre-
quent refinancing.83 In short, this compensation structure both created
and fostered brokers' impetus to match borrowers with pricey mortgage
products.84
This "quick payday" mentality did not consider the long-term suita-
bility of the mortgage to the borrower.85 "Having no long term interest
in the performance of the loan, a broker's incentive is to close the loan
while charging the highest combination of fees and mortgage interest
76. Brescia, supra note 5, at 296-97.
77. See Gretchen Morgenson, Was There a Loan It Didn't Like, N.Y. TIMES, N.Y. Ed., Nov.
2, 2008, at BUI.
78. See Lieu, supra note 38.
79. Guttentag supra note 29.
80. Liar Loans to Prolong Mortgage Crisis, A.Z. CENT., Aug. 18, 2008.
81. See id.
82. Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 8-9 (citation omitted).
83. See id. at 9.
84. See id. at 28.
85. Brescia, supra note 5, at 297.
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rates the market will bear."' 86 The broker's profit-maximizing behavior
certainly diverges from and may directly conflict with consumers' inter-
ests.87 This behavior continued unabated without any meaningful
enforcement of regulations prohibiting such conflicts of interest.
The "quick payday" mentality was perpetuated by the asymmetric
information between borrower-broker and broker-market. "The chain
made valuation opaque; information was lost as risk moved through the
chain."88 In this way, brokers could conceal the ill-suitability of many
mortgages to the borrower or even that the borrower had no verified
income.8 9 Borrowers were not worried as long as housing prices contin-
ued to rise.9" They had no motivation to verify the accuracy of borrower
information when risk was so easily passed along the chain and their
compensation was independent of mortgage credibility.
III. WHERE WE ARE: CURRENT REGULATION
For the sake of clarity and simplicity, this article will focus exclu-
sively on current regulatory schemes in Arizona, California and Flor-
ida-states that have been infamously hard-hit by the housing crisis.9 1
The expectation would be that these states had deficient mortgage broker
regulations enabling the housing crisis. However, this article's examina-
tion of these three states' regulatory frameworks below shows the neces-
sary laws were on the books well before the crisis struck. What was
lacking instead was meaningful enforcement of these laws.
A. Regulation in Arizona
A mortgage broker doing business in Arizona, called a "loan
officer," is exempt from Arizona law if the broker does business under
another state's laws.9" This exemption may be a disservice to Arizonan
borrowers if the other state in which the broker practices does not
enforce its own laws. There are three prerequisites to obtaining a license
86. Credit, Capital and Communities: The Implications of the Changing Mortgage Banking
Industry for Community Based Organizations, HARV. U., JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES,
William Apgar, et al., Policy Paper No. CCC04-1, Mar. 9, 2004, at 4-5, available at http://www.
jchs.harvard.edu/whatsnew/new-pubs.html.
87. See Lieu, supra note 38.
88. Gorton, supra note 50.
89. See Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 9.
90. See Brescia, supra note 5, at 295.
91. Between 2000-2004, Arizona home prices increased 41 % and subprime mortgages grew
from 13% of all originated loans to 20%. During the same period in California, home prices
ballooned 225% and subprime mortgages went from composing 13% to 22% of mortgages
originated. Housing prices in Florida increased 134% during this period; subprime mortgages
went from 14% to 23%.
92. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-902 (1987).
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in Arizona.9 3 First, the State administers a written test.94 The test's con-
tent is determined by a testing committee appointed by the superinten-
dent.95 However, the statute requires testing of a broker's knowledge of
basic agency concepts.96 Given the superficial nature of the test, it is
unlikely to serve as an effective barrier to entry. Second, a course of
study must have been completed within the prior three years.9 7 Third,
the applicant must have a minimum of three years of experience as a
mortgage broker or have five years of equivalent lending experience. 98
The superintendent may require additional information on the "back-
ground, honesty, truthfulness, integrity . . . " of the applicant yet this is
not required.9 9 These three basic requirements are easy to satisfy, and
even easier to falsify given many states' limited resources.
Once a license has been granted, the broker must post.a ten-thou-
sand dollar surety bond before conducting business.'0° In order to
receive compensation from a given transaction, a broker must be
licensed, "reasonably supervise" the loan originator, and make the
proper disclosures.' 10 Required disclosures include information regard-
ing the borrower's ability to make the loan payments. 102 Again, verify-
ing that these requirements have actually been satisfied would impose an
enormous cost on the state. Further, the requirements are easy to meet on
a superficial level and so are not meaningful prohibitions on brokers'
activities.
Regulations of broker conduct are governed by a superintendent. 
0 3
Grounds for revoking a broker's license broadly include if the licensee is
shown to be not a person of honesty, truth, or good character.' °4 How-
ever, when revocations occur they are often on a larger firm level rather
than on the individual broker level and consequently do not serve as an
effective deterrent for the mass of brokers.1
0 5
While this set of regulations was enacted in 1987 and is thus some-
93. See § 6-903(B).
94. See § 6-903(B).
95. See § 6-908.
96. See § 6-908.
97. See § 6-903(B).
98. See § 6-903(B).
99. § 6-903(C).
100. See § 6-903(G)-(H).
101. § 6-909(I)(2), (Q).
102. See § 6-907(A)(3)(b).
103. See § 6-903(C).
104. See § 6-905(A)(2).
105. See In re Revocation of the Mortgage Broker License of Lending House Financial Corp.
and Doron Jampolsky, No. 09-BD042 (Ariz. Dep't of Financial Institutions, May 14, 2009). This
administrative decision is illustrative of enforcement actions against large firms, as opposed to
individual brokers.
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what outdated, the legislature has taken more recent action. Working
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in 2008 Arizona instituted
"Operation Cash Back" to investigate and prosecute mortgage fraud.,
0 6
One month into the program thirty arrests had already been made in
mortgage fraud-related cases in the Phoenix and Tucson areas."°7 How-
ever, this investigation appears to be too little, too late. Arizona has also
passed a new law regulating individual loan officers. It establishes a
criminal background check as a prerequisite to licensing.10 8 However,
the law was not effective until recently, in January 2010.1°
B. California Regulation
The predominant source of mortgage broker regulation in Califor-
nia is the California Residential Mortgage Lending Act.'"0 Unlike Ari-
zona, California does not exempt from its regulation "loan brokers"
doing business in other states."'
A real estate broker's license must be held by anyone who
"[s]olicits borrowers or lenders for or negotiates loans or collects pay-
ments or performs services for borrowers or lenders or note owners in
connection with loans secured directly or collaterally by liens on real
property."'1 2 Since California does not issue "mortgage broker licenses"
but instead "real estate broker licenses," the licensing requirements are
not specific to mortgage brokering as is the case in other states. 3 The
lack of tailoring regulations to mortgage brokers specifically is a weak-
ness of the California laws, since mortgage brokers encompass a cate-
gory of their own within the broader real estate market.
Also, a "residential mortgage lender" may act as a broker under its
license if the lender enters into a written agreement with the borrower. 114
To be a licensed residential mortgage lender, an applicant must complete
educational courses required of real estate licensees.115 The fact that a
lender may act as a broker with merely the written consent of the bor-
rower evokes the question of whether the borrower is informed in enter-
106. See Chris Casacchia, New Arizona Law Imposes Regulations on Loan Officers, PHOENIX
Bus. J., July 14, 2008, at Al l.
107. See id. (citation omitted).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 50000, et seq. (1994).
111. CAL. FIN. CODE § 50003 (1994).
112. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10131(d) (1999).
113. Cal. Dep't of Real Estate Mortgage Lending Section, Frequently Asked Questions:
Mortgage Loan Brokering in California, March 2007, pg 1.
114. CAL. FIN. CODE § 50701(a) (1994).
115. See CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 50700(c), 50705 (1994).
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ing into this agreement, thus negating the purpose of the writing
requirement to begin with.
The California Department of Real Estate indicates mortgage bro-
kers must disclose in writing to both borrowers and lenders all fees
received in connection with brokering a loan, including rebates or pre-
miums. 116 The requisite disclosure statement must include the estimated
costs to be paid by the borrower, the loan brokerage commission, terms
of the loan and maturity date of the loan. ' 7 These requirements can
easily be satisfied as long as the numbers are buried somewhere within
the pile of pages, but ensuring the borrower has actually been disclosed
this information is the regulation's aim. Most significantly, California
imposes a fiduciary duty on mortgage brokers." 8 Yet meaningful
enforcement of that duty requires more than words on paper.
Even though California legislation is more contemporary than its
Arizona counterpart, the former has also recently acted in response to
the crisis. As of September 2008 there were approximately thirty-five
thousand mortgage brokers in California. State legislators recently pro-
posed a bill that would have prohibited "mortgage steering, in which
borrowers who qualify for lower-interest mortgages are persuaded to
take higher-cost and higher-risk loans."''' Yet California Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill, reasoning it would have put
state brokers at a competitive disadvantage and would thus only induce
brokers to find ways to bypass the regulation instead. 120 The bill would
have really only prohibited one type of fiduciary duty breach and would
have thus been repetitive in that California courts have expressly found
mortgage brokers owe a fiduciary duty to borrowers.12 '
California has also recently enacted ten mortgage-related bills.
22
Among other things, these bills "require brokers to disclose their license
number upon first contact with customers, allow regulators to suspend a
real estate license for violations of state law and establish a state mort-
116. See Letter to Mr. Chris Salazar, President of California Association of Mortgage Brokers
(Aug. 1, 1991) (on file with Cal. Dep't of Real Estate).
117. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10241 (1989); see also Dennis L. Greenwald & Michael
Asimow, Cal. Prac. Guide: Real Prop. Trans., Ch. 6-D Mortgage Loan Brokers and Mortgage
Loan Broker Agreements (2008).
118. See Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 F.3d 773, 782 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Letter to Mr.
Chris Salazar, President of California Association of Mortgage Brokers (Aug. 1, 1991) (on file
with Cal. Dep't of Real Estate).
119. Marc Lifsher, Schwarzenegger Vetoes Bill Increasing Oversight of Mortgage Brokers,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at C3.
120. See id.
121. See supra note 118.
122. See Michael Shaw, Schwarzenegger Signs California Mortgage Bill, S.F. Bus. TIMES,
July 8, 2008, http:l/www.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2008/07/07/daily34.html.
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gage refinancing program."'' 23 While these recent laws are all well-inten-
tioned, their efficacy is only evident when enforced.
C. Florida Regulatory Scheme
"Florida has the most statutory provisions regulating mortgage bro-
kers." ' 24 The Florida Financial Services Commission, Office of Finan-
cial Regulation, Division of Finance rules supplement the statutory
provisions.
The three statutory prerequisites to obtaining a mortgage broker
license are payment of an application fee, fingerprinting, and no prior
invalidating criminal history.'2 5 The commission has the authority to
require additional information from any applicant.' 26 A license applica-
tion will be denied if the applicant has committed an enumerated viola-
tion 12  or has a pending criminal prosecution or administrative
enforcement action involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or other acts of
moral turpitude.
1 28
On their faces, these regulations impose sufficient obstacles to
obtaining a license for those of questionable backgrounds. Yet, as stated
above,' 29 hundreds of licensed brokers in Florida should have been
denied licenses due to their criminal histories. So the solution to the
current crisis is not enacting duplicative regulations. Instead, the regula-
tions already on the books need to be actually enforced.
Also, the commission has authority to promulgate rules regarding
license renewal. 3 ' During the two-year period immediately preceding
the renewal deadline, mortgage brokers must successfully complete at
least fourteen hours of professional continuing education.' 3 ' The content
of such education must cover primary and subordinate mortgage financ-
ing transactions and applicable statutory provisions.'
32
Licensed mortgage brokers are prohibited from simultaneously
associating with more than one licensed mortgage brokerage business,
licensed mortgage lender, or licenses correspondent mortgage lender.
33
123. Lifsher, supra note 119.
124. Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 20.
125. See FLA. STAT. § 494.0031 (2006).
126. See § 494.0033(2)(d) (such additional information may include the applicant's "full name
and any other names by which he or she may have been known, age, social security number,
qualifications and educational and business history, and disciplinary and criminal history").
127. See §§ 494.001-494.0077.
128. See § 494.0033.
129. See supra note 2.
130. See § 494.0032.
131. See § 494.00295(1).
132. See § 494.00295(1).
133. See § 494.00331.
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The Office of Financial Regulation "may conduct an investigation...
whenever [it] has reason to believe, either upon complaint or otherwise,
that any violation . . . has been committed or is about to be commit-
ted." 13 4 Complaints may be filed and their status monitored electroni-
cally via the Office's website. 35  While the investigations can be
effective deterrents to broker misconduct, it is dubious whether the state
has the resources to carry out thorough and sweeping investigations if
the state lacks the resources to first verify the satisfaction of license
requirements.
Florida law also prohibits mortgage brokers from employing any
device or scheme to defraud,136 to engage in a transaction or course of
business in connection with a mortgage loan purchase or sale that oper-
ates as fraud, 137 or to obtain property by fraud or willful misrepresenta-
tion. 38 Brokers are further proscribed from knowingly and willfully
concealing or falsifying a material fact, making any false statement, and
knowingly using any false document.'39 Broadly, brokers may not
extend credit "without regard to the payment ability of the borrower.' 140
Disciplinary action may be taken when a broker employs "[f]raud, mis-
representation, deceit, negligence, or incompetence, in any mortgage
financing transaction."' 4'' Again, while these regulations establish a suf-
ficient floor on broker conduct, what is necessary is their effective
enforcement.
Florida laws also mandate certain disclosures mortgage brokers
must make. The disclosures relate mostly to fees the broker receives
from the transaction. 42 When making loans to non-institutional inves-
tors, brokers are subject to heightened disclosure requirements, includ-
ing disclosure of any broker-appraiser relationship. 43 The disclosures
must be in writing and presented when the loan is offered and anytime
the terms of the adjustable rate mortgage loan materially change before
closing. "44 The Florida Fair Lending Act also imposes additional disclo-
sure obligations. 4 5 The only relevant in this context is disclosure con-
134. § 494.0012.
135. See REAL Online Services Guide: File a Finance Complaint, http://www.flofr.coml
REAL/Forms/FileComplaint.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
136. See § 494.0025(4)(a).
137. See § 494.0025(4)(b).
138. See § 494.0025(4)(c).
139. See § 494.0025(5).
140. § 494.00791(6).
141. § 494.0041(2)(b).
142. See § 494.0038.
143. See § 494.0043.
144. See § 494.0038.
145. See § 494.0078.
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tent and timing changes for high-cost home loans. 14 6
While Florida has the most comprehensive regulatory scheme of all
states, it also recently adopted new legislation in response to the current
crisis. The most salient of such efforts has been the Florida Emergency
Rule mirroring the federal Secure and Fair Enforcement in Mortgage
Licensing Act of 2008.147 The legislation adopts stricter licensing stan-
dards when the applicant has a criminal background. Such legislation
was necessary in Florida, the state with the nation's highest mortgage
fraud rate.' 48 Florida's administrative bodies are also undergoing inter-
nal change, as the former Financial Regulation Commissioner resigned
in September 2008.149
Similarly to the regulations in Arizona and California, it is apparent
that all the states' regulations impose sufficient standards regarding bro-
ker licensing, conduct, and discipline. However, as will be discussed, the
regulations are rendered meaningless if they are not enforced.
50
IV. WHY ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING REGULATIONS IS NECESSARY
A. What Went Wrong
First and foremost, the housing bubble burst.15 "The current crisis
has its roots in housing, a mainstay of the economy, and with the bub-
ble's bursting the damage has been enduring and severe."' 52 When hous-
ing prices fell, refinancing was no longer an option and credit became
tight. As a result, foreclosures and delinquencies spread like wildfire. 
51
State housing markets and mortgage defaults proved more closely corre-
lated than originally thought. 54 While most of the wrong had been done
by then, the burst exposed mortgage broker activities that had gone
unnoticed during the boom.
When the first signs of the impending crisis manifested, mortgage
market insiders' response worsened the inevitable. 55 Some of the under-
lying bad actions by brokers may have resulted simply from incomplete
146. See § 494.00792.
147. See Florida Financial Services Commission, Emergency Rules 69VER08-1, 69VER08-2,
and 69VER08-3 (Aug. 12, 2008).
148. See Bill Kaczor, State Let Ex-Cons Do Mortgages, New Report Says, HERALD TRIBUNE,
Sept. 17, 2008, at 7B.
149. See id.
150. See infra Part IV.A-B.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
152. Lowenstein, supra note 53.
153. See James R. Hagerty, Foreclosures, Overdue Mortgages Increase Again, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 6, 2008, at A3.
154. See Lowenstein, supra note 53.
155. See Samuel, supra note 58, at 258 ("The problem was then amplified by unqualified and
unlicensed mortgage brokers, who either did not fully understand or had no misgivings about
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information given to borrowers-less than full disclosure of loan terms,
for instance. 156 However, as the examples below demonstrate, other bro-
ker actions were more akin to intentional fraud.
157
One example occurred in Los Angeles where a mortgage broker
stole identities to buy homes and also cut up documents and pasted them
onto other documents. 58 Brokers in neighboring states were not much
better. Described as the "Bonnie and Clyde" of mortgage fraud, one
Nevada couple allegedly stole $8.7 million in straw buyers mortgages-
mortgages in which there were no buyers in reality. 59 In another exam-
ple brokers attempted to bribe loan processors to approve loans.16° Such
bribery includes one broker who allegedly flat-out offered to pay for a
Washington Mutual processor's son to go to football summer camp. 16
The processor rejected the offer, but was disciplined by her bosses for
investigating the veracity of borrower and home information for that
broker's loan.' 62 While a complaint has since been filed bringing bro-
kers' and lenders' bad actions to light in that Washington Mutual exam-
ple, there were probably thousands more similar schemes going on
throughout the nation. 163 Such mortgage fraud has and will continue to
impose enormous costs on the market."6 Yet as the bubble burst, bro-
kers rushed into a panic trying to reap the last few riches on the fall
down.
B. Why More Regulation is Not the Answer
The current crisis is an opportunity to revamp the regulatory
approach to an industry that represents a significant role in both the
housing market and the U.S. economy. However, the numerous calls to
leading people into mortgage products without fully disclosing the potential risk associated with
these products.").
156. See Liar Loans to Prolong Mortgage Crisis, A.Z. CENT., Aug. 18, 2008 ("[Borrower] was
attracted by the low monthly payments, but says the mortgage broker who signed him up for the
loan didn't tell him the principal balance could increase. It has risen about $24,000 to $276,000.").
157. See, e.g., Bradley & Skillern, supra note 75 ("The broker had added $6,500 in fees to
[borrower's] loan, and changed the loan from a fixed-rate to a more expensive adjustable-rate
mortgage.").
158. See Rocco Parascandola, Mortgage Broker Pleads Guilty to Scheme, Newsday, July 1,
2008, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/mortgage-broker-pleads-guilty-to-
scheme-l.882859?qr=l (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
159. Martha Neil, "Bonnie and Clyde" of Mortgage Fraud Stole $8.7M, Feds Say, A.B.A. 1.
REAL EST. & PRop. L., at 1 (Oct. 30, 2008).
160. See Morgenson, supra note 77.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See In re Washington Mutual, Inc., No. 07-1809 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 5, 2008).
164. J. Alex Heroy, supra note 15, at 325 ("Mortgage fraud perpetrated in 2006 has been
estimated to cost anywhere between almost one billion dollars and $4.2 billion, and the numbers
are rising each year.").
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arms from a wide array of media, political, and citizen groups must be
cautiously considered.
One of the most popular measures being espoused is creating an
express fiduciary duty. 65 The rationale behind the existence of a fiduci-
ary duty-two parties in which one relies on and trusts the other-
clearly applies here. Specifically, there is a relationship of trust between
borrower-broker and even lender-broker. The borrower trusts the broker
to be its intermediary with the lender and to represent its best interests,
and the broker is authorized as the borrower's agent to carry out that
representation. However, the process of drafting, voting into law, and
implementing such legislation would be futile and a waste of legislative
resources at this stage of the crisis. Additionally, if the basic standards of
broker conduct espoused in current legislation were not enforced then,
there is no assurance that establishing a fiduciary duty by legislation
would be any more effective. Certainly the legislation could give private
plaintiffs an express cause of action, but borrower-plaintiffs suing under
contractual breaches already have convincing grounds to argue for a
court to impose an implied fiduciary duty.
Further, such regulation would be duplicative in at least several
jurisdictions. Some states, including California, have already expressly
imposed such a duty.' 66 As alluded to above, even states that have not
made an express finding would be hard-pressed to not implicitly find
this duty given the current panic and likely impending litigation.
A better alternative is to actually investigate and penalize bad
behavior.'67 This would not only partially remedy past wrongdoing, but
would create an incentive for brokers to voluntarily assume this fiduci-
ary duty as being in their best interest. 68 Instead of expending judicial
and legislative resources to pass a law imposing a fiduciary duty,
enforcement agencies should thoroughly pursue wrongdoing. "Rather,
we must create an environment that will promote full disclosure to all
market participants that in turn will lead to serious monitoring of finan-
cial institutions, rating agencies, and related entities, resulting in severe
discipline for non-compliant behavior."'' 69 The threat of enforcement
should be a significant risk to brokers such that the benefits of compli-
ance with the law would exceed the potential costs of non-compliance.
165. See, e.g., Havard, supra note 27, at 742.
166. See Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 F.3d 773, 782 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Letter to Mr.
Chris Salazar, President of California Association of Mortgage Brokers (Aug. 1, 1991) (on file
with Cal. Dep't of Real Estate).
167. See Samuel, supra note 58, at 257 ("Optimally, any such scheme must provide for
vigorous and meaningful penalties for non-compliance.").
168. See Brescia, supra note 5, at 304-06.
169. Samuel, supra note 58, at 256.
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Another widely advocated measure involves increasing mortgage
broker license requirements. One way of doing this would be to regulate
who is eligible to obtain licenses. Federal legislation prohibiting tiers of
criminal offenders from obtaining broker licenses is aimed toward this
goal yet is also duplicative of state legislation. 17 Since the federal law
has already been passed, criticizing the necessity for such regulations is
a moot point.
An additional licensing alternative would be to increase bond post-
ing requirements. However, one study has found bond posting require-
ments actually do more harm than good.17' The study noted how "state
licensing of mortgage brokers increased at both the extensive (more
states) and intensive (more restrictions per state) margins between 1996
and 2006." 172 This was oddly the prime period in which the crisis devel-
oped. Therefore, increasing bond requirements by state legislation obvi-
ously was not effective during the ten-year period that was the
foundation for the current crisis, so its efficacy after-the-fact is
improbable.
Notwithstanding this, "a surge in mortgage foreclosures has pro-
vided political momentum for the enactment of further regulation."'
173
While the public impetus is there, the aforementioned study found
increasing licensing requirements is unlikely to improve consumer out-
comes and may even decrease competition, increase foreclosure rates,
and result in a higher percentage of high-interest rate mortgages.
174
Therefore, enacting that type of legislation is not likely to yield the best
outcome for the outraged public.
Instead of imposing duplicative regulations that could actually be
inimical to consumer interests, states should more vigorously enforce
regulations that are already on the books. Additional regulations may
impede the recovery process by limiting the financial market's
reemergence potential.'75 Further, more regulations may do more harm
to the U.S. mortgage market than good. 176 "[Tihe US system of financial
regulation has been built up over the years into a staggering skyscraper
170. See Casacchia, supra note 106; see also Florida Financial Services Commission,
Emergency Rules 69VER08-1, 69VER08-2, and 69VER08-3 (Aug. 12, 2008).
171. See Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3.
172. Id., supra note 3, at 3 (citation omitted).
173. Id.
174. Id., supra note 3, at 3-4 (citation omitted).
175. See Samuel, supra note 58, at 256 ("A heavily regulated market might have lower
volatility, but it is also more cumbersome and slow in developing new and creative financial
products that stimulate growth.").
176. Gerard Baker, More Regulation Will Harm, Not Help, Recovery, THE TIMES, Sept. 19,
2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/gerard-baker/article478248I.ece
(discussing United States mortgage market in addition to global perspective).
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of rules and institutions that induce a sort of governing paralysis. The
regulatory framework is not too small."' 17 7 As discussed above,1 78 legis-
lation at the state level is on its face adequate yet actual enforcement is
not.
In addition to being potentially duplicative, such regulations may
impose costs on mortgage transactions exceeding any potential benefits.
"[W]e cannot ignore the fact that regulation can impair the efficient
functioning of our financial systems by making transactions more cum-
bersome and costly and indeed may even produce direct financial
harm." 179 Therefore, more regulation may impose both immediate and
long-term costs on financial markets and states whose budgets are
already pinched.
Instead, wronged consumers need more involvement in the process
than merely submitting a complaint online and tracking the complaint's
progress through administrative red-tape.1 80 They should be able to
access more information about the broker ex ante and have meaningful
redress ex post. By enforcing regulations, including regulatory investiga-
tions thereunder, consumers can verify remedial actions are being taken
and should be given a voice in the investigatory process.
Administrative bodies must also act more rapidly to detect and
redress fraud. In one example, the investigation of a Coral Gables lender
was initiated five months after the lender's default rate exceeded twice
the national average. 1" By the time action was taken, its default rate had
reached thirteen times the national average.' 82 The inaction on the part
of the state permits fraud to be continued. Instead, once a consumer files
a complaint, either the mortgage broker's license should be put on hold
or there should be a notation made in a public record indicating the
pending complaint.
Given the summary of existing laws in three of the nation's hard-
est-hit states, it is clear the statutory standards give enough power to
even administrative bodies to investigate suspicious conduct. Consumer
complaints should be promptly and seriously investigated, and officials
should not wait for the crisis to reach its zenith before taking action.
What is clear from similar past crises is quick-fixes are not the
177. Id.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 91-148.
179. Samuel, supra note 58, at 221-22.
180. See, e.g., REAL Online Services Guide: File a Finance Complaint, http://www.flofr.com/
REALlFor-mslFileComplaint.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
181. See Barry Meier, As F.H.A. 's Role Grows, So Does the Risk of Fraud, N.Y. TImES, N.Y.
Ed., Dec. 10, 2008, at B 1.
182. See id.
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answer. 183 As stated, increasing occupational regulation has been shown
to and may actually reduce the quality of an occupation's output.' 84 The
current regulations on the books in California, Arizona, and Florida set a
viable long-term standard for the industry. Actually implementing and
enforcing these laws is necessary to reach a lasting resolution.
V. ENFORCEMENT AS A SOLUTION: IMPLICATIONS AND
POTENTIAL CRITICISMS
While perhaps unpopular in the wake of a crisis often attributed to
deregulation, this position strikes a necessary balance between regulat-
ing an industry, doing so efficiently and effectively, and allowing occu-
pations to engage in monitored self-policing.' 85 This position keeps the
task of regulating mortgage brokers still in regulators' hands while rec-
ognizing that this is probably best carried out at the state level. Retaining
local control over mortgage brokers increases the likelihood of actual
enforcement since state regulators are best-equipped to investigate and
monitor local brokers' activities.
Additionally, this position advocates efficiently managing the legis-
lative process. Having a cornucopia of regulations does not necessarily
ensure better results; Florida is an example of this. 86 This article care-
fully evaluates the knee-jerk response to crises calling for government
intervention and increased regulation.
In short, history demonstrates that the cycle of financial crisis fol-
lowed by regulation, followed by new financial crisis, followed by
new regulation, has continued unabated .... What becomes clear is
the limited utility in the future of a pattern of new regulations aimed
at protecting us after the fact from the most recent crash, without the
ability to predict and protect us from possible future financial
crashes. 187
In place of the widely-advocated immediate response for increased regu-
lation, this article urges states to actually enforce existing regulations to
create the proper incentive structure whereby brokers will police
themselves. 1
88
183. See Lowenstein, supra note 53.
184. See Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 27.
185. See generally Samuel, supra note 58, at 229 ("The difficult task is to find ways to let the
financial markets blossom with these kinds of initiatives and innovations without the dampening
effect of cumbersome, costly, complicated, and time-consuming regulations, while also protecting
the public and investors from the abuses and predatory conduct that appear in the wake of market
success.").
186. See Kleiner & Todd, supra note 3, at 20 (citation omitted).
187. Samuel, supra note 58, at 228.
188. See Brescia, supra note 5, at 304, 306.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The current economic crisis evidences the need for change in many
respects, significantly to this article in the context of mortgage broker
regulation. The increased origination of subprime mortgages, the struc-
ture of the contemporary mortgage industry and its risk transfers, and the
housing bubble all enabled to the mortgage broker's rise. Self-perpetu-
ating adverse incentives due to the mortgage broker compensation struc-
ture further solidified their position in the market. State regulations in
Arizona, California and Florida are illustrative states that had already
imposed adequate regulations by the time the crisis struck. Thus, this
article asserts that what was probably lacking instead was enforcement
of these laws.
While states could simply enact more legislation, the only poten-
tially positive effect of this would be a temporary boost in approval rat-
ings by appeasing public opinion. Instead, ensuring that mechanisms are
in place so that regulators are equipped to deal with the next crisis
requires enforcement of existing regulations. This is a long-term solution
to a fundamental problem that has developed over the past thirty years.
2010] 1169
